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Gary Shapiro, Archaeologies of Vision: Foucault and Nietzsche 
on Seeing and Saying. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003. 458 pp. ISBN 0226750469. 
Reviewed by Krzysztof Ziarek, SUNY - Buffalo 
Response by Gary Shapiro, University of Richmond 
Enactive Art: Thinking and Multiplicity 
In Archaeologies of Vision, Gary Shapiro sets out to change our understanding of the role of 
vision and its archaeology in Nietzsche and Foucault, and in particular to suggest the importance 
to both thinkers of exploring alternatives to the dominant regimes of the visible. He takes issue 
above all with the notion that Foucault critiques, or even rejects, vision and visibility because of 
their inscription within the modern operations of power as surveillance, disciplining, and, more 
recently, bio-power. As a counter to this widespread misperception of the aims of Foucault's 
critique, Shapiro claims that we need first, to examine the archaeologies of vision, that is, the 
conditions, mechanisms, and practices of rendering visible, and, second, to reevaluate the role of 
vision and visibility in Foucault, as well as in the work of his greatest single influence, Nietzsche. 
Disagreeing with, among others, Martin Jay, Shapiro argues that Foucault, rather than showing 
that vision as such is dangerous, is interested in describing the rise and organization of various 
forms of visibility and should, therefore, be seen not as a critic but as an archaeologist of vision: 
So it is not a question of denigrating vision; it is rather a question of being alert to the 
different visual practices, often quite conflicting, that operate in the same cultural space 
and sorting out their specific structures and effects. Foucault has no arguments against 
vision in general. He is an archaeologist of the visual who is alert to the differential 
character of various visual regimes and to the disparate and possibly conflicting visual 
practices of a single era. (9) 
In Shapiro's view, Foucault not only does not disqualify vision but, on the contrary, diagnosing 
and critiquing the changing dominant modes of visibility—from representation in Velázquez to 
simulacra in Magritte or Warhol—he in fact strives for an alternative mode of visibility which 
would resist the dominant patterns of making visible. 
At the core of Shapiro's Archaeologies of Vision lies the idea of extending Foucault's 
archaeological approach from discursive practices to the regimes of the visible. Shapiro is 
interested in developing an archaeology of the visual that would be able to explore the changing 
practices of visibility and, in particular, the shifting formations of visibility in painting. As he puts 
it in the Preface, "Archaeologies of Vision aims at restating the question of what constitutes the 
history of art in the language of Nietzsche, Foucault, and some of their intermediaries such as 
Bataille, Klossowski, and Deleuze . . ." (xiv). As I have already mentioned, crucial to this 
argument is Shapiro's contention that the critique of ocularcentrism in Nietzsche and Foucault 
does not mean an abandonment of compromised vision and visibility for the sake of a nonocular 
or nonvisual orientation but entails an attempt to explore alternative modes of visibility. To that 
effect, working closely with Nietzsche's and Foucault's numerous remarks on painting, Shapiro 
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engages in a series of ekphrases, that is, in a succession of verbal descriptions or accounts of 
paintings and works of visual art. Indeed these numerous descriptions and readings of a wide 
range of artworks from Raphael, Hals, Velázquez, and Lorrain, to Manet, Kandinsky, Klee, 
Magritte, Warhol, and Michals, constitute the better part of the book. As a result, any sustained 
attempt to address Shapiro's study would have to engage with the details of these numerous 
interpretations, since it is these varied readings that trace the archaeology of the visible the author 
is after, an archaeology which both tracks the changing patterns of visibility and diagnoses the 
often disparate or even conflicting visual practices of the same age. Obviously, to undertake such 
a response would require a different venue, one where there would be ample time to discuss in 
some detail particular paintings, say Raphael's Madonnas, Manet's paintings challenging 
perspective, or Magritte's simulacra of the pipe. It would entail analyzing not only Nietzsche's and 
Foucault's comments discussed by Shapiro but also Shapiro's own commentary on these readings, 
as well as his numerous extensions of such ekphrases to other paintings or artists. Here I can only 
encourage you to read this fine book to become acquainted with the particulars of these 
interesting descriptions and intricately woven commentaries. I would draw your attention in 
particular to readings which, at least for me, stand out among the many proposed in this long and 
careful study: Shapiro's reading of Foucault on Las Meninas, his comments on perspective in 
Manet's paintings, or his analysis of Warhol and Pop Art in a debate with Arthur Danto. 
Given these constraints, I will focus in the remainder of my presentation on one of the most 
interesting strands of Archaeologies of Vision, namely on what I take to be its underlying 
argument with regard to contemporary art. Shapiro sees contemporary art in terms of its different 
way of thinking and instantiating the visual: no longer through the prism of representation, which 
relies on the notion of the original/real to be represented/copied, but instead as continuously 
multiplying simulacra. This reading highlights the fact that one of the most important ways in 
which art can resist the monological tendency of many modern visual regimes is through 
repetition deployed as an alternative to imitation. Thus, one could say that the visibility produced 
by art today is one of intensifying repetition, no longer concerned with the proper or exact 
representation of the non-existent original. The thinking of the visible at work in such art is a 
thinking attentive to difference and repetition, and even more than that, a thinking which itself 
produces difference and repetition. This approach evolves out of the intersection of Nietzsche's 
notions of multiple perspectives and the eternal return of the same, Foucault's comments on 
modern painting, and, above all, Deleuze's discussion of the phantom and the simulacrum. Set in 
the context of Warhol and Pop Art, this reading engages polemically with Danto's interpretation 
of Pop Art, which Shapiro sees as "making the (traditional) Hegelian point that art at its highest is 
a reading, articulation, and presentation of the collective soul (Spirit or Geist) to itself" (353). 
What worries Shapiro in Danto's approach is its elimination or drastic reduction of the role of 
ekphrasis, of the verbal account of visual works, and the shift of focus onto the manner in which 
Warhol's work raises philosophical questions not through its visual appearance but through its 
reflection on the status of the work of art and its relation to reality. In short, Warhol's work is no 
longer a representation of contemporary consciousness but "it is contemporary consciousness 
itself" (353). Danto's interpretation takes its cue from the traditional duality of reality and art, 
duality which seems to disappear in Warhol's work, in which a Brillo Box (the artwork) becomes 
indiscernible from a Brillo box. Shapiro suggests that in Danto's view, it is only theory, 
specifically a theory of art and of consciousness, that distinguishes between Warhol's artwork and 
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its exact counterpart in the supermarket. In the end, "Danto thinks like a Platonist, who sees the 
form or idea, not itself visible, that differentiates the artwork from a mere being" (356).  
By contrast, for Foucault, the multiplying Brillo boxes draw our attention to the matrix or the grid 
of multiplicity. These boxes no longer refer to the "original," "real" Brillo box, but instead keep 
ceaselessly referencing one another in a spreading series of phantoms or simulacra. What Warhol 
effects through repetition is an emptying out of meaning, as the boxes no longer refer to reality, 
effecting a sudden illumination of multiplicity with nothing at its center. For Foucault, Warhol's 
work cuts its relation to reality, and, as a result, as Shapiro suggests, the boxes refer to nothing 
and "they say nothing" (357). What thus becomes most significant about Warhol's art is its 
gesture of abandoning the dualism of the original and the copy and of exchanging this duality for 
the grid of multiple simulacra. The notions of the simulacra and the phantom which Shapiro 
deploys in his reading come from the Epicureans, who "held that objects throw off or radiate 
infinitely many phantasms or simulacra, and so they are taken by Deleuze and Foucault as 
providing a model of thinking that avoids the closures and unities of Platonic or Hegelian 
dialectics" (358). The model of reality in Deleuze and Foucault is no longer one based on the 
mirroring effects of the original and the copy, the idea and its appearance, but, instead, one which 
operates on the principle of infinitely multiplying phantasms or simulacra. This shift from the 
model of reality which casts thinking in terms of representation to the notion of continuously 
differing simulacra produces a requisite transformation in thinking: "replacing a 
representationalist image of thought with a form of thinking that understands difference and 
repetition as primary features of being that need not be traced back to the concepts of identity and 
resemblance" (358). 
As Shapiro points out, Deleuze finds an analogue for this revolution in thought in art's shift from 
representation to abstraction, in which art abandons the image but not, however, visuality itself. 
On the contrary, the forgoing of the image opens up a new perspective on visuality, allowing 
painting, and more broadly, visual and media art, to examine, in a quasi-archaeological manner, 
the emergence and constitution of the modern regime(s) of the visual. In Foucault, Shapiro 
remarks, this change corresponds to the difficult manner of thinking acategorically, that is, apart 
from categories, without allowing such thinking released from the organizing principle of 
categories to become simply tantamount to what Foucault calls "stupidity." Deleuze's remarks on 
Pop Art, which works by rupturing the hierarchical relation between originals and copies, shows 
how this different thinking evinces an ethical dimension. In Deleuze's formulation, Warhol's use 
of technological means of reproducing images produces an ontological shift in reality, in which 
the foundational conception of the original and its always imperfect copies becomes displaced in 
favor of the notions of difference and otherness evidenced by the multiplying simulacra. As 
Shapiro puts it in his remarks on Deleuze's reading of Warhol, "the truth of art is not in imitation, 
but in repetition" (362). Art thus becomes an emblem of the Nietzschean return of the same, 
where what returns and repeats itself are differences, differences which each time, with each 
recurrence, occur differently, resulting in an endless multiplication of difference as its own 
simulacrum. 
I would like here to briefly examine this argument which Shapiro evolves from Deleuze and 
Foucault into the context of technology, or of what Heidegger calls the essence of technology, and 
which, for the purpose of keeping it distinct from the notion of technology understood as 
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technological processes, means, or products, is referred to as technics or technicity. What prompts 
this manner of questioning is, on the one hand, the fact that, while Archaeologies of Vision 
repeatedly touches on the issue of technology, because of its specific interests and goals, it does 
not explicitly raise this problem as, historically speaking, increasingly determining both the status 
of art and its aesthetic practices. On the other hand, I am also interested in exploring whether 
contemporary art stops, as it were, at the moment of what Foucault calls "the sudden illumination 
of multiplicity itself." Do artworks like Warhol's point beyond a painterly instantiation of the grid 
of multiplicity, drawing attention precisely to the manner in which contemporary technicity 
subtends and organizes our regimes of the visual and their aesthetics of multiplicity? 
My question has to do with the force of resistance and difference which both Deleuze and 
Foucault associate with the proliferation of simulacra. I agree with Shapiro that the visibility 
operating in terms of differentially repeating simulacra resists the monological or monocular 
tendencies of vision, testifying to the multiple and differential character of seeing, and 
complicating any claims about a possible unity of the practices of the visible. At the same time, 
this kind of displacement or, to put it more strongly, discarding, of the original/copy binary for the 
optics of multiplying simulacra without the original, as Benjamin may be taken to point out, lies 
at the heart of the operations of modern technology. Indeed, there are many indications that 
modern technology, or better, technicity, works on the principle of resistance to and the almost 
emblematic dispersion of the monological vision of reality. In this view, technicity can be seen in 
terms of its resistance to the older, monocular patterns of visibility, say in a manner parallel to the 
way that, for Foucault, disciplinary power replaced the monological law of the father. But then, as 
Foucault argues, bio-power has already displaced, or at least requalified and recast, the practices 
of disciplining and surveillance characteristic of modernity. Against this backdrop, the productive 
and regulative vectors of bio-power can be seen in Nietzschean terms as a further stage or a 
contemporary intensification of the will to power.  
In a Heideggerian reading, bio-power and its regimes of visibility would signal another step in the 
intensification of the essence of technology, or of technicity. As Heidegger remarks in his 1941 
lecture series, Basic Concepts, technology taken in this sense is an already decided mode of 
world-interpretation: 
The modern position is the "technological." It is not technological because there are steam 
engines and then the combustion motor, but there are these things because the epoch is 
technological. What we call modern technology is not only a tool and a means, over and 
against which today's man can be a master or servant. Before and beyond these possible 
attitudes, technology is an already decided mode of world-interpretation, which 
determines not only the means of transportation, subsistence, and recreation but also the 
possibilities for any human attitude whatsoever . . . .That means the practical mastery of 
technology in its unconditional development already presupposes a metaphysical 
subjugation to technology. (15) 
Modern technology succeeds brilliantly in calculation and calculative manipulation of reality, 
because the actual comes to be revealed as already enframed by technicity, that is, as in principle 
calculable, or in today's terms, as information, open not only to cognition but also to ceaseless 
reprocessing and engineering. Heidegger's claim here is that contemporary reality is shaped by a 
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long-standing, metaphysical subjugation to technicity, subjugation which points back to ancient 
Greece, but which in fact becomes visible only retrospectively, at the time of modernity's 
culmination. As a matter of fact, this pointing back to Greece becomes itself visible only to the 
modern, technicist eyes, eyes which are already open before, as it were, we can see or deploy 
technological prostheses utilized for increased visibility. As Heidegger continues, 
"Accompanying this subjugation within us is an attitude that grasps everything according to plan 
and calculation, and does so with a view to vast time-spans [sic] in order willfully and knowingly 
to secure what can last for the longest possible duration" (Basic Concepts 14). This metaphysical 
subjugation disguises itself as will to power, which in turn presents itself as the human will to 
dominate and manipulate. It is indeed the human will to develop and master technology that 
indicates this long-standing subjugation to technicity, subjugation whose operative terms translate 
in the contemporary world into the global reach and density of the vectors of bio-power. 
What I am suggesting here is that perhaps the multiplicity, the simulacra-like operations of 
modern visibility, already constitute channels of the essentially technicist—at least in Heidegger's 
view—operations of power. The issue, then, would be, on the one hand, what kind of effects 
technicity has on the possibilities of vision and visibility, and, on the other, the resistance capacity 
intrinsic in the visibility which operates on the principle of multiplying simulacra. Without doubt, 
simulacra resist the tendency of the metaphysical forms of visibility to seek the original, establish 
its centrality, and thus turn all simulacra into the always imperfect copies of the (missing) 
original. In fact, as Shapiro's study eloquently shows, what I am calling here tentatively 
"metaphysical visibility"-- and Deleuze would have probably agreed with this term—is never 
simply monocular, despite its strong impulse in this direction. This metaphysical visibility has 
always been, at least potentially, a clash between monocular vision and visibilities operating in 
terms of phantoms or simulacra. Perhaps what we call the end of modernity is the stage at which 
this conflict emerges as constitutive of the metaphysical field of Western vision. If that were the 
case, then simulacra would be a matter of resistance in relation to the monological templates of 
the visual. However, the multiplicity of simulacra would at the same time indicate the deployment 
of the most contemporary vectors of technicity, as perhaps suggested by developments in genetic 
engineering, cloning, replication of information, etc. 
Given Shapiro's diagnosis of contemporary art, a diagnosis with which I agree to a large extent, I 
would like to ask whether we perhaps need to give a further turn to what Foucault calls 
acategorical thinking. Specifically, what I would like to signal in this context is the degree to 
which such thinking operating in contemporary forms of the visual can be seen as enactive, that 
is, as enacting a transformed relatedness, contrasting with forms of relations instantiated by the 
technological regimes of the visual. I am choosing this term "enactive" deliberately in order to 
emphasize two points. First, the thinking at issue here, thinking exemplified in modernist and 
contemporary art, is not reflective, representational, or imitative, but constitutes, instead, a kind of 
act. Second, this thinking is not "inactive," with the prefix "in," even though it is often mistakenly 
taken to be so. As homophones, "enactive" and "inactive" sound identical and remain 
indistinguishable in speech. The distinction between enactive and inactive indeed becomes visible 
only in writing, and its becoming visible may signal an emergence of an altogether different 
visibility, one on whose parameters modernity has been laboring at least since Nietzsche. At stake 
in this play between "enactive" and "inactive" is a displacement of the notion that the enactive 
manner of thinking involved in art is simply inactive, that is, passive and without effect, or that its 
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production of difference is just a reproduction devoid of transformative force or of any ability to 
intervene in the so called "real world." At one point in his book, Shapiro mentions the "force of 
painting" (323), the force which I would like to consider here more closely. One way to do this is 
to ask whether this force associated with painting can indeed be explained in terms of resistance 
to the forms of visibility produced in modern disciplinary or carceral societies. If that is the case, 
then such resistance risks being limited to reactive forces, while its seemingly creative impulse 
may simply constitute a version or a modality of reactive action responding to the disciplining and 
formative social forces. Would there be any room left for Nietzsche's sense of the creative force, 
one that would be beyond a yes and a no, an affirmative force to the second degree, so to speak: 
creative, and perhaps even transformative, without being reactive? 
Returning to the first aspect of enactive thinking, we can see that, as an act, such thinking 
precedes theory and practices, reflection and doing. In the opening paragraph of "Letter on 
Humanism," Heidegger describes thinking as prior to both theory and practice: "Thinking does 
not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it becomes applied. 
Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the 
highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man" (Basic Writings 217). This "action" is 
the simplest, because it concerns the way in which the world has always already become open to 
us, the way it has been laid out, as Heidegger suggests in Basic Concepts using the word 
Weltauslegung (world-interpretation), but, more originarily, the laying out of the world. Such 
thinking is the highest not because it transcends the everyday world and practice, but because, 
conversely, everyday acting and living are always already embedded in it, embedded not in a 
transcendental but instead an originative, enacting manner. It is the highest for Heidegger because 
it lays out the vectors which shape the ways in which relations unfold and are carried out. Toward 
the end of the essay, Heidegger returns to this point: "Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also 
surpasses all praxis. Thinking towers above action and production, not through the grandeur of its 
achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its 
inconsequential accomplishment" (262). This neither theoretical nor practical deed of thinking 
enacts, brings into being, and renders visible in a manner that is no longer metaphysical, and thus 
also no longer technicist. And it is not technicist because, as Heidegger points out, it does not 
make, produce, or effect—it does not open up what is by enveloping it into the operations of 
power. Yet because this thinking does not produce or effect, from the point of view of the 
metaphysics of production, it appears to be "inactive," rather than "enactive." It seems to do 
nothing and, as such, to constitute the opposite of all action: it comes to be seen as the epitome of 
passivity and indifference, characterizations we know only too well from Marxist and Frankfurt 
School critiques of Heidegger. 
Such thinking could be seen as enactive only when it calls into question and displaces the 
technicist laying out of the world, since within the already technicist operations of power, this 
thinking appears to be sapped of all force, an empty theorizing, with no desire or power to act. 
Yet this thinking is enactive precisely to the extent that it transforms the manner in which the 
world comes to be laid out and thus opened to interpretation and action, to practice and reflection. 
This way of thinking (en)acts by no longer subjugating the way that the world lays itself out for 
us to technicity. If technicity is a laying out of the world which presents the world, in the sense of 
rendering it present, as intrinsically available in its "postmodern," dazzling display of multiplicity, 
difference, and repetition, the thinking which, by contrast, would not subjugate itself to technicity 
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would have to enact in a manner that, as I have suggested elsewhere, would free and disengage 
itself from power.  
For Heidegger, such thinking is poietic; it acts and reveals poietically rather than technicistically, 
and, as such, finds itself at work in particular in artworks. This poietic thinking would be enactive 
in just this sense that, without producing or effecting anything, without acting in the usual sense 
of the term, it would call into question the technicist way in which the modern world opens and 
lays itself out as intrinsically available: as a multitude of differences available to various and 
increasingly flexible forms of calculation without the need to order them in relation to an origin or 
an original. In the context of Heidegger's engagement with technicity and the a-metaphysical ("a" 
privative) thinking, I would like to return to the question of the relation between the "sudden 
illumination of multiplicity itself," so critically important to Deleuze and Foucault, and technicity. 
Contemporary art most frequently challenges and resists the temptations of the monocular 
visibility, and here I agree with Shapiro, through the repetition of simulacra and the multiplicity 
of perspectives. But then, we also need to ask whether this multiplicity, whether Nietzschean, 
Deleuzian, or Foucauldian, is not "always already" outstripped by the technicist operations of 
power, and whether its illumination does not precisely throw light on the pervasiveness and 
multiplicity of operations with which technicity lays out today's world. Put differently, does not 
the archaeology of the contemporary visibility of the multiplicity of simulacra show this form of 
visibility to be precisely technicist? Are the resistances evinced by contemporary art intrinsic to 
the intensifying deployment of technicity or can art also elicit and draw out a different, poietic 
Auslegung, a non-technicist laying out of the world? This form of eliciting or educing would be 
the enactive thinking of art, its "deed" before theory and practice. It is on this question, I think, 
that our answer to questions about the status and significance of contemporary art, might pivot. 
Thanking Gary Shapiro for his important and thought-provoking book, I would like to say that, 
giving us numerous illuminating comments on Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze, on painting and 
the changing regimes of the visual, Archaeologies of Vision also did what the adjective I have just 
used to describe it said literally: it provoked me to think through the issue of visibility and 
multiplicity raised persuasively by the author. I hope that it continues to elicit questions and 
discussions crucial to our understanding of art. 
Response by Gary Shapiro 
Diagrams and Multiplicities 
Krzysztof Ziarek frames the question of art's possibilities in terms of Heidegger's notion of poietic 
thinking. Relying on that thought—which he has articulated and explored in powerful and 
nuanced ways elsewhere—he asks whether the art of multiplicity is or can be an affirmative form 
of poietic thinking or whether it is necessarily in thrall to the reign of Technik. In Archaeologies 
of Vision (AV) I discuss the Heideggerian problematic of presence and absence in the visual 
discourse or metaphorics characterizing Western thought since Plato. Heidegger drew attention to 
the specifically visual character of the Platonic eidos and idea. He reads Plato's story of the cave, 
demonstrating how it obscures obscurity itself, in its artful construction of the stages of 
philosophical illumination (a demonstration that Luce Irigaray presupposes in "Plato's Hystera.") 
In Archaeologies of Vision I argue that Heidegger's questioning of vision's role in the Western 
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metaphysical tradition need not be understood as a "denigration" of vision but as a stimulus to 
rethink what vision is. I claim that Foucault is rethinking vision in the wake of Heidegger and 
Nietzsche. 
Still, I have some difficulties with Heidegger, and so with Ziarek's question. I hope that 
explaining them briefly at the outset will help to clarify the project of Archaeologies of Vision and 
perhaps help to articulate some of the ways in which I would like to continue to think about the 
possibilities for art. My questions to Heidegger and so to Ziarek center upon thinking, poietic 
thinking, and Technik. Yes, Heidegger made a decisive contribution in renewing the question was 
heisst Denken? ("what is thinking?"). But I have to agree with Alain Badiou that Heidegger is 
one-sidedly "poetic," seeing the poem as the only real possibility for thought. For example, he 
disvalues mathematics, understanding it as simply part of the calculating, measuring, and 
totalizing power of Technik. With Plato, Kant, Peirce, Bergson, Deleuze and others I would stress 
the thinking (and creative thinking) involved in mathematical thought.  
The theme of the matheme and the poem leads to two related questions about multiplicity and 
affirmation. Is the art of the multiple affirmative or reactive? And, more generally, what are the 
possibilities of affirmative art today? Ziarek identifies one of the major topics of Archaeologies of 
Vision: its concern with the way in which the art of multiplicity can offer an alternative and 
possible resistance to "monocularism," or more generally, to restrictive visual regimes. He says 
that he agrees with me, both of us in the wake of Nietzsche, Foucault, Benjamin, Deleuze and 
others, that much of recent and contemporary art is indeed an art of multiplicity. Ziarek goes on to 
raise what he calls a Heideggerian question as to how this art, which engages in a multiplication 
of the simulacrum or the phantasm, is best understood in relation to technology or technicity 
(Technik). Does the art of multiplicity exhibit a resistance to technicity or does it in fact always 
operate under its sway and in its shadow? I raised a similar question in the first section of the 
book, titled "Iconoclasm and Indoctrination: The Taliban and the Teletubbies." When I was 
writing that section before 9/11, the Taliban had gained international cultural attention by their 
iconoclastic destruction of the monumental Buddhas of Bamiyan. However great the loss to art, 
religion, and history involved in those explosions—which may in one sense be the largest scale 
iconoclastic act of all time—the destroyers apparently understood it as a principled act of political 
and religious power. For them, those colossal statues were unclean, blasphemous, and forbidden 
idols. We can note that Mohammed Atta, captain of that day's hijackers, was also an iconoclast. 
He had written an MA thesis on the preservation of the traditional Arab city in the context of 
globalization/Americanization. For Atta the twin towers must not only have represented United 
States power, they must also have appeared as contemporary versions (simulacra?) of the Tower 
of Babel. Iconoclasm is typically straightforward in its attribution of power to the image and in its 
own exercise of power. In Archaeologies of Vision I paired an account of Taliban iconoclasm 
with some questions about the children's television program, The Teletubbies, where questions of 
power and principle are not so obvious. In other words, I think I was raising the question, in 
Ziarek's terms, whether this apparently most innocent delight for infants ought to be described as 
one that operated by means of the simulacrum of the TV screen to invite its audience to imagine 
themselves as cyborgs networked to an abyssal succession of simulacral images. Is The 
Teletubbies then simply a demonstration of the reign of technicity, sporting with its power in the 
bodies and minds of the young? Here Ziarek and I might both find it useful to invoke Heidegger's 
discussion of Technik.  
8
Bryn Mawr Review of Comparative Literature, Vol. 6, No. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://repository.brynmawr.edu/bmrcl/vol6/iss1/1
  
BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 6, Number 1 (Winter 2007) 
Ziarek calls attention to my contrast of Foucault and Arthur Danto in their very different accounts 
of Andy Warhol. I suggest that Foucault is alert to the multiplicity of "the eternal phantasm," 
whereas Danto is captivated by the exact resemblance of Brillo Box and its mundane model while 
neglecting the multiplicity of the many boxes. Is Warhol then simply instantiating Technikin his 
multiplication of images? Or does his work taken on a larger scale—not focusing as Danto does 
on a single replica of the Brillo Box—interrogate the technological itself? Foucault's ekphrasis of 
Warhol mentions advertising images, car crashes, and electric chairs. He in turn is commenting on 
Deleuze's discussion of Warhol and Pop Art in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze explains that 
this work intervenes in a "daily life . . . [that is] standardized, stereotyped and subject to an 
accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption . . . in order to make the two extremes 
resonate—namely the habitual series of consumption and the instinctual series of destruction and 
death. Art connects the tableau of cruelty with that of stupidity, and discovers underneath the 
consumption a schizophrenic clattering of the jaws, and underneath the most ignorant destructions 
of war, still more processes of consumption." Ziarek acknowledges the power of resistance in 
such art, but asks whether and how the art of the multiple in the age of Technik can be poietically 
productive and affirmative. I will attempt to answer his question by first clarifying Foucault's 
notion of the diagram (and emphasizing its affinities with Heidegger's idea of the productive Riss 
which is the originative opening of the work of art) and then raising some questions about how we 
are to understand Ziarek's concept of affirmative art. 
In Archaeologies of Vision I give some attention to the Foucauldian notion of the diagram, which 
elicited some fine pages of commentary from Deleuze. The diagram is a dispositif, an 
arrangement of forces, a crossing of geometry, power, and invention. It is not merely a technicist 
device in the service of a holistic project of enframing. The diagram enacts (to use Ziarek's term, 
and to speak with Heidegger) by opening up, disclosing, and letting be. Heidegger's discussion of 
the originality of the work of art, its originative character, is relevant here. The Greek temple, as 
Heidegger describes it in "The Origin of the Work of Art," sets forth a world and lets the earth be 
an earth. Heidegger's elucidation of this originarity is couched in terms that suggest diagrammatic 
qualities: Gestalt, Riss, Abriss, Aufriss, Umriss, Grundriss. The Foucauldian notion of the 
diagram that I attempt to develop in Archaeologies of Vision is perhaps indebted to Heidegger in 
ways that might seem surprising if we think only of the contrast, say, between the Greek temple at 
Paestum and the Panopticon. The diagram, Foucault argues, is a form or manifestation of 
power/knowledge. It is not merely reactive or repressive but "productive" (Foucault's analogue of 
Ziarek's "enactive"?). Two of the several diagrams of art that I discuss in Archaeologies of 
Visionare Nietzsche's schema of the tragic theater in The Birth of Tragedy (BT) and Foucault's 
sketch of the development of a new conception of the space of viewing (the museum, gallery, and 
similar spaces) in his lectures on Manet and elsewhere. Nietzsche (in section 8 of BT) 
demonstrates the doubled perspective of the onlooker (Zuschauer) in the Greek theater. Nietzsche 
focuses on the architecture of the theater, and later he explicitly says that architecture is neither 
Apollonian nor Dionysian. It is, we might say, art in "the grand style." The theater involves a 
framing that enables what Nietzsche calls an Übersehen. The spectators simultaneously look 
down on the tragic actors on the skene and also look up at them in so far as they identify with the 
chorus in the orchestra below the skene. This diagram contrasts with what Nietzsche, in another 
diagrammatic analysis, calls the "one great Cyclops eye" of Socrates. I argue that for Nietzsche 
both the hidden image of archaic times and the double vision in the Greek theater were 
alternatives to the aesthetics of presence. In a fairly direct if unsubtle reading of Heidegger we 
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might suppose that given the preplatonic situation of both of these visual practices, he might see 
them as enactive forms of visual thinking (borrowing Ziarek's term again), forms that bear a 
relationship to Platonic vision (as in the myths of Republic and Phaedrus) analogous to the 
relationship that the words of the presocratics have to the Platonic metaphysics of presence. Of 
course, both the hidden image in the archaic temple and the double vision of Greek theater 
involve a setup or dispositif, an arrangement of spaces and practices, that might be called 
technological. Would Heidegger or Ziarek see the reign of Technik as extending so far? I suspect 
not, if Technik involves calculation and predictability, as Ziarek suggests, for it seems that it is the 
happening of difference that emerges in these situations. But if these too are instances of Technik, 
then I wonder whether the notion has been extended so far that it no longer has a meaningful 
alternative or contrast. 
By the time of Aristotle, the sense of the double perspective and so of the visual and performative 
dimension of tragedy has been almost completely obscured. Foucault's most highly developed 
analysis of the diagram is his discussion of the Panopticon, which has led to his being 
misconstrued by some commentators (e.g. Martin Jay) as being an anti-visual thinker. But I try to 
show in Archaeologies of Vision that Foucault understood the changes in art and its viewing 
practices that cluster for him around the figure of Manet as the development of another visual 
diagram. It replaces the transparency of Panoptic windows with the limitation to the frame and the 
canvas. Traditional illumination is discarded, indirect glances replace the gaze, the windows of 
the Panopticon are shuttered, and a new diagram of visibility is instituted. While revisionary art 
historical thinkers like André Malraux show how the museum and photographic reproduction 
reduce (and Heidegger would say enframe) art, Foucault sees that in some ways the museum and 
Manet's painting are productive.  
Suppose that the modern system of the arts (as Paul Kristeller showed) takes form only in the 
eighteenth century; and suppose that its institutionalization tends, intentionally or not, to 
compartmentalize the arts, detaching them from their associations with festival and its social 
volatility. Let us acknowledge that the signature practice of the museum is close attention to 
visual surfaces, which practice tends to lead to dissociation of painting from the festive and the 
political, and that the museum thus becomes an emblem of modernism, understood, following 
Kant and Clement Greenberg, to consist in the establishment of distinct realms of the theoretical, 
the practical, and the aesthetic. Foucault can acknowledge all this and does in his lectures on 
Manet and in his discussion of the museum in "Fantasia of the Library." Yet even as the dispositif 
of the museum is crystallizing, its form provokes and allows consequences that were at first 
unintended. Manet's painting and Flaubert's Temptation of St. Anthony deploy the structures of 
library and museum to open up new possibilities of writing and seeing. Modernists may read this 
as brilliant ways of ironizing (and thus reinforcing) the fundamentals of genres and practices. 
Foucault, like Deleuze, thinks that irony is highly overvalued. While Foucault could be said to be 
situating and urbanizing the Heideggerian Riss or Gestalt, he is suspicious of positions like later 
Heidegger's occasional claim that anything which arises from Technik is necessarily caught up in 
a project of total reframing. The metanarratives involved in what we used to call the Plato-to-Nato 
story will yield, I think, to the kind of analysis that Foucault articulates in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History."  
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I am suspicious of the monism, the re-emergence of the One, involved in Heidegger's concept of 
the current incarnation or dispensation of being, while I acknowledge the critical value of 
reflecting on the framing and manipulation implicit and explicit in our assumptions and practices. 
Here we have an issue about thinking that has provoked Heidegger's most acute (mostly French) 
readers and critics to ask penetrating questions, not rejecting his question about thinking, but 
questioning the limitations of the way in which he posed it: Why must the remains of the 
Presocratics and a few German poems form the horizon of the question? 
Since, as Ziarek notes, much of Archaeologies of Vision is concerned with the question of 
ekphrasis, of what Foucault calls the "infinite relation" of seeing and saying, there may be a point 
in recalling some of the limitations in Heidegger's ekphrases. If Heidegger is our inspiration for 
understanding poietic thinking, should we not be very cautious—following his call for "the 
cultivation of the letter" in the Humanism text—in looking at his own writing? Consider the most 
celebrated and notorious Heideggerian ekphrasis, that of van Gogh's painting of the two shoes. I 
omit a quotation of this well-known, solemn invocation of a peasant woman's life on the earth and 
of the art historian Meyer Schapiro's equally naive description of the painting as van Gogh's 
meditation on his own situation through depicting a "personal object," supposedly his own shoes. 
Heidegger says about his ekphrasis "this painting spoke," and that reminds me of one of 
Nietzsche's notes: "if the visual arts could speak they would sound stupid to us." As Derrida 
demonstrated, both of these ekphrases foreclose the possibility of multiplicity, both return the two 
shoes to a single owner. The doubling of two left shoes, dramatically unlaced, is perhaps the 
simplest form of multiplicity, one that is amplified in Derrida's conceit of a "polylogue for n+1 
female voices." (I note parenthetically that it is perhaps an unfortunate effect of Heidegger's 
monistic conception of Technik—which tends to engulf the mathematical—that the mathematical 
dimensions of essays like Derrida's "Restitutions" have been neglected by all readers, so far as I 
know.) That Heidegger did not thematize the question of ekphrasis—as Foucault, Lyotard, 
Derrida, and Kristeva do—should make us cautious in using his conception of poietic thinking to 
assess the prospects of the visual or spatial arts. We need to ask whether Heidegger's poietic 
thinking can count beyond one. When Heidegger says "this painting spoke," we want to ask the 
Nietzschean question "who is speaking?" 
With all these reservations, let me say that I find Heidegger's thought about place and space 
enormously suggestive for thinking about the possibilities of contemporary art and the art to 
come, something that I tried to explore in writing about the American "earthworks artist" Robert 
Smithson (whose most famous work, Spiral Jetty, is in the Great Salt Lake). 
For now, I want to turn to the issue/question of ekphrasis. As Ziarek observes, much of 
Archaeologies of Vision is devoted to the question of ekphrasis, the literary or discursive genre in 
which a verbal text describes or evokes a visual work of art—as the subtitle says, the book 
concerns "Foucault and Nietzsche on seeing and saying." (I acceded to the editor's advice to 
reverse the chronological order of the names.) Specifically, I worry, explore, question, read and 
reread some of the ekphrases that these two thinkers produced. Although Foucault's essay on Las 
Meninas is well known, as is his little book on Magritte, there are many other accounts of painting 
scattered about in his writings, both in single books and in the many interviews and essays in Dits 
et écrits. A few have noticed Nietzsche's description of Raphael's Transfiguration, but he has 
much more to say about Raphael, Claude Lorrain, Dürer and others. I did not at first realize that it 
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was this questionable genre of ekphrasis that was the nerve of the book, its obsessive line of 
flight. It is, I see in retrospect, my own gesture toward multiplicity, for I attempted to account for 
as many of these ekphrases as I could, extrapolating sometimes from a few sentences here or 
there, and occasionally adding a few of my own that seemed to amplify the practice of Nietzsche 
or Foucault. Sometimes I saw points of contact, contrast, or variation, as with Nietzsche's Greek 
theater and Foucault's Panopticon as diagrammatic structures, or Nietzsche's lordly naming of 
Raphael's hovering Christ as Apollo and Foucault's analysis of the floating image of the pipe in 
Magritte in their shared concern with the phantasm. I eventually saw that I was following 
Deleuze's suggestion that we must read Foucault diagonally, experimentally, seeing the entire 
project across essays and interviews as well as the more celebrated books. I was choosing an 
angle, a perspective, a line of flight marked by a series of crossroads, intersections, of word and 
image, as Foucault explains in his review of Panofsky. I began to wonder how philosophical 
textual practices were related to images, or what sort of thinking happens in the crossings or 
chiasms generated by this practice. It was a revelation to find that Foucault had added an 
illustration to the second edition of the History of Madness, Frans Hals's seventeenth-century 
group portrait of The Regentesses of the Old Men's Almshouse, but that nowhere in the text had he 
mentioned these cold, frightening figures dispensing judgment, and gazing with steely, merciless 
eyes. Instead, Foucault referred in an interview to a brilliant ekphrasis by Paul Claudel, a 
Christian thinker whom some might be surprised to find Foucault celebrating. As Foucault says in 
his Las Meninas essay, there is an infinite relation between what we say and what we see, and that 
essay itself, I argue, needs to be read not only as an ekphrasis but as a commentary on that 
practice. There is a crack or a rift between seeing and saying as well as a rich interplay of the two 
that itself varies with different visual regimes. It is this rift itself that can operate as the opening 
for various practices of writing, marking, depicting, and image-making, including some of those 
focused on the production of multiplicity. 
What's interesting in ekphrasis is the gap, the "infinite relation." It's a "hole" in Technik, one 
perhaps that is constantly being covered over—by writers, docents, audio guides in museums, 
new internet technologies—and yet which is continually opening up again. It's not just the case 
that Nietzsche and Foucault favor an art of multiplicity, although on the whole they do. It's also 
that their practice of ekphrasis exhibits and reflects on the gap, the infinite relation, of what 
Deleuze will call discursivity and visibility in his commentary on Foucault. Nietzsche marks this 
edge in his description of Raphael's Transfiguration when he renames the floating Christ as 
Apollo. In his essay on Magritte Foucault understands the celebrated "this is not a pipe" 
painting—its actual title is Les deux mystéres (The two mysteries)—as a disassembled calligram, 
so that there is an abyssal relation between his verbal account of the painting and the painting's 
internal play of word and image. In Foucault's best known ekphrasis, that of Velazquez's Las 
Meninas, he forces us to think the ekphrastic genre by explaining his own initial protocol of 
proceeding without the use of proper names. He performs the fiction of the lecturer and docent in 
insinuating the first person plural, the "we," with whom the reader/auditor/spectator unreflectively 
identifies, before questioning the possibility of that "we" construction when the painting is 
summoned up again in "man and his doubles." 
Archaeologies of Vision explores the question of ekphrasis as the gap or the edge between seeing 
and saying. A fuller philosophical inventory of this question, one that I hope to elaborate, would 
focus on a much wider body of texts than those of Nietzsche and Foucault. It might begin with 
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Homer's celebrated description of the shield of Achilles in the Iliad, an ekphrasis of an impossible 
work of art purportedly composed by a blind man. As this canonical example suggests, absence 
and distance are there from what we take to be the beginning of this genre, and variations on the 
theme are played by such ancient art writers as Philostratus and Pliny. The question of the 
absence of the work is thematized by Diderot in his Salons (meant to be read by those who could 
not see the pictures he was describing), and by August Schlegel in Die Gemälde, a dialogue about 
the paintings in the Dresden Gallery (one of Nietzsche's main sources). Schlegel's characters 
discuss the paintings from a distance, not in the gallery, but out on the Belvedere overlooking the 
river, in order to exacerbate the "infinite relation." Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind is a detailed 
examination of the chiasmatic relations of seeing and saying.  
If Ziarek is right—I extrapolate from his remarks—then I have produced a guidebook—a 
Cicerone, the title of Burckhardt's guide to Italian art that Nietzsche admired so much—a 
guidebook to the ruins of a rather pervasive agon between monocular and multiple vision. It is 
limited to a rather specific slice of thought as it emerges in Nietzsche, Foucault, and some of their 
antagonists, interlocutors, and sources. Like Burckhardt's guide, and unlike Hegel's, mine aims at 
being more archaeological and geographical than at exhibiting a dialectical and historical 
development. In that sense it is not a brief for contemporary art. If it does not pose the question of 
whether contemporary art of the multiple can free us from the reign of Technik, as Ziarek says, it 
also does not buy into those metanarratives, whether Hegelian or Heideggerian, in which the 
possibilities of human authenticity and the fate of thinking pivot on the question of whether 
contemporary art can be trulypoietic, whether the art to come will fulfill a certain promise. 
Nevertheless, I agree with Ziarek that there are limitations, call them if you will technological, 
that structure Nietzsche's and Foucault's engagement with the visual. As I suggest very briefly in 
the Preface to Archaeologies of Vision, for all of Nietzsche's brilliant account of the structured 
double vision of the tragic theater and of Foucault's sketch of the diagram of the museum, both 
could do more to thematize the limitations of the grid of gallery or museum.  
Thinking about such places for art brings me back to Ziarek's question about contemporary art 
and of an art to come. Heidegger's discussion of place, site, and spatiality is productive here. 
What is the place of thinking, he asks, as he questions the bridge in "Building Dwelling 
Thinking," or the Greek temple in the "Origin" essay. In writing about poetry, he asks what and 
where is the Ort that grounds the Erörterung? Some places and sites, he thinks (however naive 
and selective we might find his limitation to the Greek and German canon), resist enframing or 
Gestell. These have the power of origin-ality.  
Ziarek's question, then, is: what is art as affirmative site? I have already tried to blur the 
distinction between "affirmative" and "productive," suggesting that the sense of the diagram at 
work in Nietzsche and Foucault, and thematized by Deleuze, is already the conception of a 
productive matrix. I hesitate to make a global assessment of the arts today in asking (a modified 
version of Ziarek's question): what are the most promising forms of contemporary art? I can only 
indicate one area which I find rich in possibilities for thinking. Elsewhere I've begun to articulate 
some of the categories and distinctions that could constitute a geoaesthetics, in a variation on 
Deleuzian geophilosophy, which in turn refers us to Nietzsche's question about the Sinn, sense or 
direction, of the earth and his concept of an architecture in "the grand style." Foucault's 
archaeology allows us to distinguish significant types among sites. So we can discriminate some 
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of the major forms of landscape art or of the garden (which Kant and his contemporaries thought 
of as a major art): the renaissance garden of similitudes, allegories, and resemblances; the 
classical garden like Versailles that exhibits a centralizing principle of power; the English garden 
of the era of man and his doubles, which while purporting to situate human beings in a natural 
world denies and yet reveals its own framing activities.  
I have named two projects that pose questions about the genealogy and prospects of art and they 
may at first seem unrelated. On the one hand, an inquiry into the necessary and productive 
absence of the image in the practice of ekphrasis; on the other, an attempt to understand the 
diagrammatic character of what is variously called earth, land, or environmental art, including the 
more traditional classifications of landscape architecture or design, and garden art. These two 
directions, I suggest, are two distinct ways of coming to terms with what, for lack of a better term 
at the moment, I will call the real (after Lacan). The first investigates the escape or absence of the 
real, despite the multiplication of the symbolic or discursive; the second concerns the ways in 
which art attempts to let the real emerge by diagrammatic constructions of the earth. Not so far 
from Salt Lake City (where Ziarek and I discussed these questions at a 2005 symposium of the 
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty extends 
into the Great Salt Lake. It suggests the inevitability of entropy (which can be construed as sheer 
multiplicity), the primacy of the geological, and the ruins of industrialization and globalization. 
As I've argued elsewhere, Smithson's work can be seen as a Heideggerian disclosure of world and 
earth. We can say with Ziarek that this work productively enacts a tensive relation of waste, 
industry, nature, and the residues of several historical worlds (Native American, nineteenth-
century industrialism, and the more recent art of the multiple). Or with Foucault we can attempt to 
articulate the diagram (his version of the Heideggerian Riss) by which this work institutes itself. 
In many ways this is an art of Technik, but it does not follow that it is only reactive. It could be 
called tragic because it reveals entropy, death, and dissolution; but Heidegger and Ziarek certainly 
follow Nietzsche in seeing tragedy as affirmation. 
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